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Swindell: Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in Sinning v. Clark

NOTE

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS IN SINNING v. CLARK-A "Hollow" Victory for the
Public Duty Doctrine
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans are conditioned from birth through death to save
money so that one day they may purchase their own home. In
modern day "Americana," this is known as the "American
Dream"- a two story house with a two car garage and a white
picket fence. Often, rather than dwell in deplorable tenant housing, many Americans will bow to the banking industry and mortgage their lives away to build a "custom home" according to their
individual tastes and preferences. Increasingly, however, this
"American Dream" has turned into an "Amityville Horror"
nightmare. 1 Although their homes are not occupied by demons
and unfit for occupation in this regard, many homeowners discover their "custom home" contains major structural defects which
make their homes uninhabitable for failure to comply with the
local building code.
Dr. and Mrs. Sinning found themselves in this situation.
Less than two years after construction, the Sinnings discovered
their home had sagging and shifting floors, doors which failed to
close, windows out of plumb, cracked sheetrock and wall materials, unlevel staircases, cracking brick veneer, a leaking roof, and
rotting front porch columns, making it unfit for occupation. 2 The
Sinnings were experiencing their own "Amityville Horror"
nightmare.
Dr. and Mrs. Sinning did not know or understand the intricacies of the building code or correct engineering calculations to
1.
house
house
2.

The "Amityville Horror" was a movie about a family in New York whose
was occupied by demons. The consensus of the viewing public was that the
was "unfit for occupation."
Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515, 516, 459 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1995).
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guarantee proper construction of their home. Instead, they relied
on their general contractor and local building inspector to ensure
compliance with the applicable state and local laws. Two tortfeasfors caused the Sinning home to be constructed and inhabited
when there was non-compliance with the building code. Dr. and
Mrs. Sinning had a cause of action against the builder for his nonconforming construction.3 The second tortfeasor, the municipal
building inspector, inspected and certified to them that their
home met the requirements of the North Carolina Building Code.5
However, in Sinning v. Clark,6 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that even though the municipal building inspector
approved non-conforming construction through negligent on-site
inspections, Dr. and Mrs. Sinning did not have a cause of action
against the municipality which employed the inspector.7 Rather,
3. An action against a builder for constructing a non-complying structure
may be predicated upon numerous grounds, including breach of contract and
breach of implied warranty. See generally Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209
S.E.2d 776 (1974).
4. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-411 (1982). Section 160A-411 provides in
part:
Every city in the State is hereby authorized to create an inspection
department, and may appoint one or more inspectors who may be given
the titles of building inspector, electrical inspector, plumbing inspector,
housing inspector, zoning inspector, heating and air-conditioning
inspector, fire prevention inspector, or deputy or assistant inspector, or
such other titles as may be generally descriptive of the duties assigned.
The department may be headed by a superintendent or director of
inspections. Every city shall perform the duties and responsibilities set
out in G.S. 160A-412[.]
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-423 (1993). Section 160A-423 provides:
At the conclusion of all work done under a permit, the appropriate
inspector shall make a final inspection, and if he finds that the
completed work complies with all applicable State and local laws and
with the terms of the permit, he shall issue a certificate of compliance.
No new building or part thereof may be occupied, and no addition or
enlargement of an existing building may be occupied, and no existing
building that has been altered or moved may be occupied, until the
inspection department has issued a certificate of compliance. A
temporary certificate of compliance may be issued permitting occupancy
for a stated period of specified portions of the building that the inspector
finds may safely be occupied prior to final completion of the entire
building. Violation of this section shall constitute a Class I
misdemeanor.
6. Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 521, 459 S.E.2d at 74.
7. Id. However, principles of tort law dictate that when a plaintiff is injured
through the negligent conduct of another party and the plaintiff proves duty,
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a cause of action accrues against a municipality for the negligent
acts of its building inspectors only where a legally enforceable
duty is created by the municipality specifically to the individual
plaintiffs. 8 In arriving at its conclusion, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals examined the liability of a municipality which has
waived its governmental immunity by procuring liability insurance for its inspection department.9 In doing so, the Sinning
court invoked the judicially created pseudo-governmental immunity of the public duty doctrine.1 ° The court relied on its decision
in Lynn v. Overlook Development," which the court interpreted as
allowing the public duty doctrine to bar recovery in code enforcement cases, to deny the Sinnings' claim.
This Note examines the North Carolina Court of Appeal's
decision in Sinning v. Clark. First, the Note briefly reviews governmental immunity in code enforcement cases. Second, the Note
provides an historical overview of the public duty doctrine and
examines the legal analysis which other jurisdictions have used to
reject the public duty doctrine in inspection cases. Next, the Note
discusses North Carolina's concept of governmental immunity and
surveys North Carolina's application of the public duty doctrine,
including the doctrine's application in Lynn v. Overlook Development. Fourth, the Note analyzes the Sinning court's application
of the public duty doctrine in light of the supreme court's decision
in Lynn and analyzes how other jurisdictions have handled similar cases and if those methods would be applicable to North Carobreach of duty, causation, and damages, that plaintiff states a claim upon which
relief may be granted. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 30, at 143

(4th ed. 1971). Furthermore, the tort principles of respondeat superior dictate
that the master of a negligent servant engaged in the master's activity should
bear the loss. Id. § 69 at 458. However, contrary to Sinning, this Note suggests
that the municipality, as master of the negligent inspector, should bear the loss
of an innocent injured from the negligent inspection of the building code enforcer.
8. Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 520-21, 459 S.E.2d at 74.
9. Id.
10. The public duty doctrine states that "a government entity is not liable for
injury to a citizen where liability is alleged on the ground that the governmental
entity owes a duty to the public in general, as in case of police or fire protection."

Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental unit from Liability
From tort liability on Theory That Only General, Not Particular,Duty was owed
Under the Circumstance, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1194, 1196 (1965 & Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter cited as "Annotation"]. For a general discussion of the public duty
doctrine see infra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
11. Lynn v. Overlook Dev. Inc., 98 N.C. App. 75, 389 S.E.2d 609 (1990), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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lina. Finally, the Note concludes that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals erred by not following the supreme court's analysis in
Lynn and suggests that the "special duty" exception to the12 public
duty doctrine applies in building code enforcement cases.
II. THE CASE
In November 1989, Dr. and Mrs. Sinning entered into a contract with Bailey Custom Homes, Inc. for construction of a home
located in New Bern, North Carolina. 13 Numerous times while
construction was in progress, Mr. Linwood E. Toler, a building
inspector for the City of New Bern with a Level III building, electrical, mechanical, and plumbing inspection certificate, inspected
the home for building code violations. 14 On December 20, 1990,
Mr. Toler issued the Sinnings a thirty-day temporary certificate of
occupancy which permitted the Sinnings to move into the home
subject to Bailey Custom Homes, Inc. "finish[ing] up small jobs."'"
Upon moving into the residence, the Sinnings discovered major
structural defects in the construction of their home including, but
not limited to, sagging and shifting floors, doors which failed to
close, windows out of plumb, cracked sheetrock and wall materials, unlevel staircases, cracking brick veneer, a leaking roof, and
rotting front porch columns.' 6
After further investigation and inquiry, the Sinnings filed a
complaint with the North Carolina Code Qualifications Board
against Mr. John F. Clark, Code Administrator for the City of New
Bern, Mr. Toler, and the City of New Bern.' 7 After an investigation, the Code Qualifications Board issued a report concluding
12. The focus of this Note is the court of appeals decision in Sinning and its
effect on the application of the public duty doctrine in a negligence action brought
by a plaintiff against a municipality for negligent inspections by their building
code enforcers. This Note does not include any actions which may be brought
under the Tort Claims Act found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291-300.1 (1993). See
generally McBride v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 257 N.C. 152, 125 S.E.2d 211
(1959) (This Tort Claims Act has no application with respect to acts of employees
of city or county administrative units). Further note that an unsophisticated
homeowner most often does not inquire into the sufficiency of the liability
insurance or the solvency of the contractor whom they entrust with the
construction of their "dream" home. Such are the facts of Sinning.
13. Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 516, 459 S.E.2d at 72.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 521, 459 S.E. 2d at 75.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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"that there appear[ed] to be basis in fact to the charge of willful
misconduct, gross negligence, or gross incompetence against
8
Lenwood (sic) E. Toler."1
The Sinnings brought an action against Mr. Clark and Mr.
Toler, acting in their official capacities as employees, and the City
of New Bern, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 19 The
Sinnings alleged the defendants were negligent in failing to locate
and require correction of numerous building code violations and
structural defects and for failing to advise them that their residence was structurally unsound and unfit for occupation.2" The
district court granted judgment in favor of the defendants and
Sinnings appealed. 2 1 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision holding that the Sinnings' complaint did not state
a claim for common law negligence.2 2 The court based its decision
on the common law public duty doctrine and concluded that "a
municipality and its agents ordinarily act for the benefit of the
general public and not for a specific individual when exercising its
statutory police powers, and, therefore, cannot be held liable for a
failure to carry out its statutory duties to an individual."2 3 In so
holding, the court of appeals declined to follow the reasoning used
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Lynn v. Overlook Development,24 which would have applied the "special duty" 25 exception
in code enforcement cases. The Sinning court stated that
the [Supreme] Court declined to decide the issue of whether [G.S.
§ 160-411-438, and the North Carolina State Building Code] created a duty owed by the city building inspector to a purchaser...
Thus, we continue to follow our decision in Lynn... and hold [that
the statutes and the code] do not create a special duty owed by
defendants to plaintiffs over and above the duty owed to the general public.26

18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

516,
516,
516,
516,

459
459
459
459

S.E.
S.E.
S.E.
S.E.

2d
2d
2d
2d

at
at
at
at

72.
73.
72.
73.

23. Id.
24. Lynn v. Overlook Dev., Inc., 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991). For
discussion of Lynn, see infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the "special duty" exception, see infra notes 113-29 and
accompanying text.
26. Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 520, 459 S.E.2d at 74.
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BACKGROUND

Governmental Immunity for Code Enforcement

Historically, the common law doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity provided an absolute defense to the tort liability
of the state and its subdivisions, including municipalities. 27 The
activities performed by governmental entities were eventually
classified as either governmental or proprietary functions. 28 Governmental functions are functions which solely benefit the general
public. 2 s Proprietary functions are "those activities which could
be performed by the private sector."3 ° Under the governmental
function-proprietary function distinction, governmental entities
are liable only when they perform functions which are private in
nature.3 Proprietary functions may create liability because the
governmental entity is held to the same standard as a private
actor would be held if the private actor performed. 2 In contrast,
governmental functions performed by the entity are immune from
liability because the entity is engaged in an activity "primarily for
the advantage of the state as a whole." 33 Code enforcement activi-

ties are considered governmental functions. 34 No reported cases
27. For a discussion of the history of the governmental immunity, see:
Deborah L. Markowitz, MunicipalLiability for Negligent Inspection and Failure
to Enforce Safety Codes, 15 HAMLINE J. PuB. L & PoL'Y 181 (1994) [hereinafter
"Markowitz, Municipal Liability"]; Patti Owen Harper, Statutory Waiver of
Municipal Immunity Upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina
and the Municipal Liability Crisis, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41 (1981) [hereinafter
"Harper, Statutory Waiver"]; Beecher Reynolds Gray, Local Government
Sovereign Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 43 (1982)
[hereinafter "Gray, Local Government Sovereign Immunity"]; see also Galligan v.
Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E.2d 427 (1970); Town of Hillsborough
v. Smith, 10 N.C. App. 70, 178 S.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 277 N.C. 727, 178
S.E.2d 831 (1971).
28. For a complete discussion of the governmental function and proprietary
function and its ramifications see: Markowitz, Municipal Liability, supra note
27; Harper, Statutory Waiver, supra note 27 at 47-49; Gray, Local Government
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 27 at 44-49.
29. Markowitz, Municipal Liability, supra note 27, at 186.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Markowitz, Municipal Liability, supra note 27. Inspections are
considered a governmental function in North Carolina. See Pignott v. City of
Wilmington, 50 N.C. App. 401, 273 S.E.2d 752, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 181, 280
S.E.2d 453 (1981) (holding that the building inspector was a "public official" of
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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have held otherwise.3 5 Absent waiver, governmental immunity
still provides an absolute defense to municipalities for the negligent performance of code enforcement and inspections.3 6 However, nearly all states provide some mechanism to waive
governmental immunity.
B.

The Public Duty Doctrine
1.

Historical Context

The public duty doctrine provides that, absent a special relationship between the governmental entity and the injured individual,38 the governmental entity will not be liable for injury to an
individual where liability is alleged on the ground that the governmental entity owes a duty to the public in general.3 9 The doctrine
the city who engaged in the performance of governmental duties and no liability
could attach unless the inspector acted maliciously or corruptly or outside of and
beyond the scope of his duties).
35. Pignott, 50 N.C. App. at 403, 273 S.E.2d at 754.
36. See Markowitz, Municipal Liability, supra note 27. For a discussion of
how to waive governmental immunity in North Carolina, see Harper, Statutory
Waiver, supra note 27 at 47-49; Gray, Local Government Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 27 at 44-49. See also Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 10 N.C. App. 70,
178 S.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 277 N.C. 727, 178 S.E.2d 831 (1971) (Except
where waived under authority of statute, the common law rule of governmental
immunity is still the law in North Carolina.).
37. See Markowitz, Municipal Liability, supra note 27.
38. This is the "special relationship" exception which arises when a citizen
becomes singled from the general population and a special duty is owed him by
the governmental entity. Such a duty is established by a special relationship
between the government and the citizen and a breach of that duty may result in
liability for damages suffered by the citizen." Annotation, supra note 10, at 1196.
For a discussion of North Carolina's treatment of the "special relationship"
exception, see infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
39. See Annotation, supra note 10, at 1196. The public duty doctrine
prohibits the imposition of liability upon a governmental unit for the
negligent breach of a statutory duty that results in damages, unless that
statute establishing that duty clearly intended to create a duty not only
to the general public but to a more limited class to which the individual
requesting relief belongs.
Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability for Negligent Inspections, 57 TUL. L.
REV. 328, 331 (1982) [hereinafter "Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability"]; see
also Markowitz, Municipal Liability,supra note 27; Note, State Tort Liability for
Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 303, 322-23 & nn.94-95
(1977) ("Government officials, and more recently their employers, have long been
held liable for their tortious conduct only if the duty of care breached was one
owed to a particular individual, and not one owed to the public in general.");
Scott J. Borth, Comment, Municipal Tort Liability For Erroneous Issuance of
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has been commonly described by the oxymoron, "duty to all, duty
to none." 40 The United States Supreme Court created the doctrine
in South v. Maryland.4 1 In South, the plaintiff sued the local
sheriff for breach of a duty in failing to provide police protection
when the sheriff refused to arrest the plaintiff's alleged kidnappers. 42 The South Court held the powers and duties of the sheriff
are by nature a public duty and "punishable by public indictment
only."43 As such, the South court concluded that the plaintiff's
cause of action failed because no duty was created to the individ44
ual plaintiff.
After the historic tort barrier of governmental immunity
crumbled and states provided waiver mechanisms,4 5 state courts
resurrected the South rule to provide limits to governmental tort
liability when their legislatures had not done so. 4 6 Thus, state
Building Permits: A National Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 548 (1983)
[hereinafter "Borth, Municipal Tort Liability"] ("The public duty doctrine
provides that a claimant who is alleging inadequate performance of a
governmental activity has the burden to show that the municipality owed a duty
to the claimant and not solely to the general public when performing the activity
in question.").
40. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976); Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979); Leake v.
Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986). The result is that one may have a duty to
exercise reasonable care to everyone, but no one can bring an action when that
duty is breached.
41. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). In South, the plaintiff alleged that the local
sheriff knew that he had been kidnapped and held for ransom for four days; yet,
the sheriff failed to try to free him or to arrest the alleged kidnappers. Id. at 39899. The plaintiff sued the sheriff for failing to provide police protection and
failing to enforce the laws of the state. Id. at 398-99.
42. South, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 398-99.
43. Id. at 402-03 ("It is an undisputed principle of the common law, that for a
breach of a public duty ... punishable by public indictment only.").
44. Id. at 402-03.
45. Sovereign immunity provided an absolute defense to the tort liability of
the state and its subdivisions. W. PROSSER ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 131 at 979
(4th ed. 1971). There was no need for the public duty doctrine because sovereign
immunity provided the limitation upon governmental tort liability.
46. See Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability, supra note 39, at 331 ("Yet
in abrogating state and municipal immunity, legislatures and courts have
recognized that there must be some limits to government tort liability... The
doctrine most frequently used to insulate governmental entities from liability is
the public duty defense . . ."); see also Borth, Municipal Tort Liability, supra
note 39, at 548 ("This legislative failure forces the courts to draw a line between
denying compensation to the victims of negligent public employees and unduly
interfering with the desirable purposes for which municipalities exist. Most
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courts embraced the public duty doctrine to confine liability to
specific types of governmental actions, namely those not undertaken for the public in general.4 7 Consequently, the revived public
duty doctrine provides a uniquely governmental defense to tort
liability where a waiver of governmental immunity has
occurred.4 8
Generally, proponents advance two arguments in support of
the doctrine. 49 First, the doctrine protects the governmental entities from a flood of lawsuits that could potentially cripple the public coffers. 50 Second, the doctrine protects governmental entities
which provide much needed but high risk services, where potential liability or the fear of potential liability would eliminate those
services. 5 ' While a majority of states accept these rationales,5 2
the public duty doctrine is not without its critics.5 3 In fact, several
courts have attempted to shape the contours of governmental tort liability in
these states by applying the public duty doctrine.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability, supra note 39, at 340
("These advocates contend, first, that the public duty doctrine is necessary to
protect governments from a multiplicity of lawsuits, some fictitious, satisfaction
of which would place a heavy drain on the public treasury. The second policy
argument against tort liability of governments is that such liability ... might
discourage government from engaging in innovative programs, with the result
that governmental agencies may abandon the field of inspection altogether.");
see also John Cameron McMillian. Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public
Duty Doctrine, 32 VILu. L. REv. 504, 513-14, n. 34 (1987) [hereinafter "McMillan,
Government Liability"] ("The principal rationales espoused by courts are fear
that abolition of the public duty doctrine will unduly interfere with governmental
operation and subject government to an overwhelming financial burden.").
50. See supra note 49.
51. See supra note 49.
52. The following states embrace some form of the public duty doctrine:
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Annotation,
supra note 10, at 1194; see also Sestito v. Groton, 423 A.2d 165 (Conn. 1979),
Frankfort Variety, Inc. v. Frankfort, 522 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977), Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984), and Barrat v. Burlington, 492 A.2d 1219
(R.I. 1985).
53. The following state cases have rejected the public duty doctrine: Adams v.
State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (abrogated the public duty doctrine in a
negligent inspection case); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (abolishing
the public duty doctrine in a negligent furnishment of police protection); Leake v.
Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (abolishing the public duty doctrine in a
negligent furnishment of police protection case); Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (abrogating the public duty
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jurisdictions reject the doctrine in an effort to ameliorate the
harsh results that can occur when a governmental entity negli54
gently provides services.

Critics advance several arguments against the public duty
doctrine. First, the application of the doctrine allows governmental entities to use the shield of sovereign immunity when the legislature no longer mandates such immunity.5 5 Second, the
application of the doctrine requires that plaintiffs injured by a
negligent official suffer solely because of the governmental status
of the tortfeasor 5 6 Third, the application of the doctrine promotes
incompetence by providing no meaningful incentive for the governmental entity to provide services of optimal quality. 57 Fourth,
even with the elimination of the doctrine, plaintiffs must still
prove breach of duty, causation, and damages; a vigorous task just
doctrine in a highway case); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980)
(abolishing the doctrine in a construction case); Wilson v. Nepsted, 282 N.W.2d
664 (Iowa 1979) (abolishing the public duty doctrine in a negligent inspection
case); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (abolishing
the public duty doctrine in a negligent furnishment of police protection case);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979) (abolishing the public duty
doctrine in the negligent issuance of a taxicab permit); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247
N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976) (abrogating the public duty doctrine in a negligent
inspection case); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) (abolishing the
public duty doctrine in a negligent police pursuit case).
54. See note 53.
55. Several courts equate the public duty doctrine to sovereign immunity.
These courts reason that because sovereign immunity was abolished, the public
duty doctrine also was abolished. See generally Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,
241-242 (Alaska 1976) ("in reality a form of sovereign immunity"); Coffey v.
Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976) (holding that the "public dutyspecial duty doctrine" reverts back to the abolished sovereign immunity
distinctions of proprietary-governmental); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz.
1982) (holding that public duty doctrine was sovereign immunity in "bright newword package"); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 730 (N.M.
1984) (holding that legislative abolishment of sovereign immunity also abolished
the public duty doctrine); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986) ("in
essence a form of sovereign immunity and viable only when sovereign immunity
was the rule"); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (holding that legislative
abolishment of sovereign immunity also abolished the public duty doctrine).
56. This theory derives its existence from one of the reasons for abrogating
sovereign immunity treating private and government tortfeasors the same,
rather than predicating liability solely upon the status of tortfeasor. See Adams
v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976) ("Where there is no immunity, the state
should be treated like a private litigant.").
57. See Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability, supra note 39, at 343-44.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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like in any other negligence action. 58 Finally, the wide availability of liability insurance allows a governmental entity limited
pecuniary exposure while still compensating the injured
individual.5 9
2.

Rejection of the Public Duty Doctrine in
Enforcement Cases

Code

Jurisdictions rejecting the application of the public duty doctrine in inspections cases combine three theories to hold a negligent governmental entity accountable. The first theory asserts
that the public duty doctrine reinstates sovereign immunity.6 °
Consequently, because the state has expressly abandoned the sovereign immunity defense for governmental tortfeasors, the traditional tort concept of foreseeablity dictates the parameters of
governmental tort duty.6 ' The second theory asserts that the public duty doctrine applies only where there is a public duty.62
Because the legislature imposes a duty and prescribes a standard
of conduct in the form of an inspection statute, the "statutory
duty" owed by inspectors constitutes an individual duty and is not
subject to the doctrine. 3 The third theory asserts that the public
duty doctrine may be overcome through the tort concepts of
affirmative action and reliance. 64 Consequently, when an inspec58. Id. at 348; see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982) and
Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986).
59. See McMillian, GovernmentalLiability, supra note 49, at 535-536 & n. 145
("The government can further protect its resources by carrying liability
insurance."); Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599 ("insurance should be obtained by the state
to protect it from financial loss").
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. See generally infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
62. Note that "recovery by individuals has usually been denied on the grounds
that the building codes were not designed to create a duty to an individual."
Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability, supra note 39, at 332.
63. Id.
64. See Coffey, 247 N.W.2d at 139 & n.2. The court relied on the
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS to hold a governmental entity responsible for
its negligent acts. It provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
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tor undertakes the affirmative act of inspection and an owner
relies on the inspector's actions, the "affirmative action duty" owed
by the inspector constitutes an individual duty and is not subject
to the doctrine.6 5 The "statutory duty" -and "affirmative action
duty" theories derive there existence from the "special relationship" and "special duty" exceptions 66 but clearly reject the application of the public duty doctrine in inspection cases.6 7 Moreover,
courts generally commingle variations of all three theories to buttress their legal analysis when holding that a governmental entity
68
owes an individual duty to a plaintiff.
Recently, several courts have rejected the public duty doctrine
in negligent inspection actions against governmental entities. 69
In the land mark case of Adams v. State,7 ° the Supreme Court of
Alaska became the first court to reject the public duty doctrine. In
Adams, the plaintiff alleged that state fire officials negligently
failed to take corrective action after an inspection of hotel premises revealed a number of fire hazards.7 1 The Supreme Court of
Alaska held the public duty defense to be "in reality a form of sov(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or third
person upon the undertaking
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
65. See infra notes 76-79, 87-90 and accompanying text.
66. One commentator would submit that there was no need to abolish the
public duty doctrine in the cases which have done so because the same individual
duty could be reached by properly employing the "special relationship" exception.
See Borth, Municipal Tort Liability, supra note 39, at 552 & n.77 (stating that
the Adams court's assumptions that it made to abolish the public duty doctrine
were "questionable because the facts of the case support a finding of a 'special
relationship.' ").
67. See generally supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). In Adams, three state fire
inspectors made a fire inspection of the Gold Rush Hotel. Id. at 238. The
inspectors found several violations and promised to send the manager a copy so
that he might correct the violations. Id. Eight months later, the hotel burned to
the ground killing five people. Id. at 236. The inspectors never sent the letter
detailing the fire hazards. Id. at 239.
71. Id. at 236. The State of Alaska defended upon the grounds that its "public
status" precluded liability because the state "owed a duty to the public generally"
and [did] not owe an actionable duty to any individual." Id. at 241.
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ereign immunity."7 2 Because sovereign immunity had been abolished by statute in Alaska,7 3 the public duty doctrine, if applied,
"would create immunity where the legislation has not."74 Furthermore,, the Adams court held "where there7 is no immunity, the
state is to be treated like a private litigant." 1
The Adams court supported their legal analysis by relying on
the common law principles of foreseeability, affirmative action,
and reliance to create an individual duty owed by the inspectors.7 6
The Alaska Supreme Court first held that the purpose of the fire
inspection was to protect life and property from fire.7 7 Further,
the plaintiffs, who were the victims of the negligent inspection,
"were members of that class; they were the intended beneficiaries
of the inspection services provided and the foreseeable victims of
the fire hazard left uncorrected." 78 According to the court, "in
undertaking to inspect and advise on the conditions in [the premises], the state undertook a duty to those injured by the burning of
the hotel, not to the public in general."79 The Adams court abolished the public duty doctrine by equating the doctrine to the
abandoned concept of sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has also rejected the public
duty doctrine in inspection scenarios. In Coffey v. Milwaukee,8 0
72. Id. at 241. The Adams court recognized the inequities of the public duty
doctrine. It stated, "an application of the public duty doctrine here would result
in finding no duty owed to the plaintiffs or their decedents by the state, because,
although they were foreseeable victims and a private defendant would owe such
a duty, no 'special relationship' between the parties existed." Id. at 241-42.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 240 ("We do not reach the issue of whether the state had a statutory
duty to take action concerning the hazards discovered at the Gold Rush, because
we find that the state assumed a common law duty by its affirmative conduct.").
77. Id. at 241 ("The purpose of fire inspection is to protect life and property
from fire.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 241. The Adams court further stated, "once an inspection has been
undertaken the state has a further duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting
fire safety inspections, and that liability will attach were there is a negligent
failure to discover fire hazards which would be brought to light by an inspection
conducted with ordinary care." Id. at 240.
80. Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976). In Coffey, the plaintiff
alleged that the City of Milwaukee negligently inspected certain defective
standpipes that were necessary to furnish water to fight fire in the building
where the plaintiff was a tenant. Id. at 134. The plaintiff asserted that the
defendants were required to inspect the standpipes pursuant to the state
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the plaintiffs asserted that the city negligently inspected fire
sprinkler devices in the plaintiff's building."' The Coffey court
first stated that the defense of sovereign immunity had been abolished in a previous decision. 2 Further; the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin emphasized that "Any duty owed to the public generally is a duty owed to individual members of the public."8 3 According to the court, "Under the circumstances of this case, there is no
distinction to be drawn between a 'public duty' and 'special

duty.'

"184

After rejecting the public duty doctrine, the Coffey court held
that the "duty to inspect is statutorily imposed" by the Wisconsin
inspection statute. 5 The court stated that "A building inspector
must be held to have foreseen that his alleged negligence in performing the required inspection might have foreseeably resulted
in harm to someone."8 6 The court further held that once the
inspector "did undertake to inspect the building, [the inspector]
had a duty to exercise reasonable care" pursuant to the tort doctrines .of affirmative action and reliance. 7 Thus, the Coffey court
inspection statute. Id. at 135-36. The City of Milwaukee defended by claiming
that "the duties imposed on the building inspector by the applicable statutes
with respect to fire safety inspection are clearly duties owed to the public in
general and not to the specific plaintiff in this case." Id. at 137.
81. Id. at 134.
82. Id. at 137 (citing to Holytz v. Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962).
The Coffey court also addressed the issue whether the abolition of sovereign
immunity created a new cause of action against governmental entities. The
court stated, "on the issue of duty, we would point out that Holytz ... did not
create any new liability for a municipality; what it did was to remove the defense
of municipal immunity from tort liability." Id. at 137.
83. Id. at 139. The Coffey court further held that "the public duty - 'special
duty' distinction espoused in the cases cited by the City of Milwaukee... set up
just the type of artificial distinction between 'propriety' and 'governmental'
functions which this court sought to dispose of in Holytz." Id. at 139.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id. at 139.
87. Id. The Coffey court cited with approval the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS.

It provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognized as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
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rejected the public duty doctrine in inspection cases by holding
that the statutorily imposed duty to inspect imposed a standard of
reasonable care on inspectors.
The Iowa Supreme Court similarly rejected the public duty
doctrine in inspection scenarios in Wilson v. Nepsted. 88s In Wilson,
the plaintiff alleged that the municipality's agent negligently
breached statutory duties relating to the inspections requiring
compliance to the building and fire codes.8 9 The court stated that
a "duty can be created by statute if the legislature purposed or
intended to protect a class of persons to which the victim belongs
against a particular harm which the victim has suffered." 90 The
Court specifically held that the "ordinances and statutes were
designed for the protection of a special, identifiable group of persons . . . from a particular harm ... not members of the public
generally." 9 1 Moreover, the particular language of the statute provided a strong "foundation on which to posit a legal duty."92 The
Wilson court emphasized that the "financial consequences of legislation must be the primary responsibility of the legislature and
cannot weigh heavily in the court's function of interpreting statutory language."93
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or third
person upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
88. Wilson v. Nepsted, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979). In Wilson, the plaintiffs
alleged statutes and ordinances relating to building codes, occupancy permits,
and fire regulation required the City of Des Moines to perform inspections, issue
certificates and permits for apartment buildings and compel compliance. Id. at
666. The plaintiffs further alleged that the city had negligently breached those
statutory duties by conducting a negligent inspection. Id. Several months after
the alleged negligent inspection by the defendants, a fire killed several guests or
residents. Id. The City of Des Moines defended upon the ground that "the
applicable state and municipal inspection laws are designed to protect the public
generally and do not create a duty of care to these individual plaintiffs." Id. at
667.
89. Id. at 666.
90. Id. at 667.
91. Id. at 672. The Wilson court further concluded that "A statutory duty
designed to protect something larger than an identifiable class is the exception,
not the rule." Id. at 671.
92. Id. at 673.
93. Id. at 674.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana also rejected the public duty
doctrine in inspection scenarios in Stewart v. Schmieder.9 4 In
Stewart, the plaintiff alleged that the city breached its statutory
duties by negligently inspecting and approving a structurally
defective building. 9 5 The Stewart court, discrediting the public
duty doctrine, stated that "under the jurisprudence of this state,
the mere fact that a duty is of a public nature, and benefits the
general public, does not require a conclusion that a city cannot be
found liable for the breach of that duty."96 The court further concluded that the public duty doctrine did not apply when "the statute or ordinance setting forth the duty indicates, by its language,
that the duty is designed to protect a particular class of individuals."9 7 The Stewart court held that the inspector was statutorily
"empowered and obligated to issue such notices and orders necessary to enforce codal compliance, to remove unsafe and illegal conditions, and to 'secure the necessary safeguards during
construction'." 9 Furthermore, the inspector breached "its duty to
examine plans for proposed construction projects, and thereby
caused injury to the plaintiff."99
94. Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980). In Stewart, the
plaintiffs brought suit against the City of Baton Rouge alleging that the city
breached its statutory duty by not examining the construction plans and by
negligently inspecting the site. Id. at 1353. The plaintiffs alleged as a result of
the city's negligence, the building collapsed during the final stage of construction
killing three construction workers. Id. at 1353. The City of Baton Rouge
defended on the ground "that even if its employees breached a duty imposed by
ordinance, it is not liable to these plaintiffs that its duties in the issuance of
permits and the inspection of construction are owed to the public generally and
not to any particular member of the public." Id. at 1356.
95. Id. at 1353.
96. Id. at 1358.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Stewart court also advanced several public policy arguments in
support of the abolition of the public duty doctrine. First, the court stated, "It
has been criticized because it places the costs of inadequate performance on the
shoulders of the innocent victims of official neglect, rather than spreading the
costs of such neglect throughout society." Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). Second,
"The doctrine is also said to be predicated upon the erroneous assumption that,
without it, a municipality would be subject to crippling judgments because of the
negligence of its employees, a fear which also hampered the abrogation of
sovereign immunity." Id. (citations omitted). Third, "The doctrine also has the
effect of removing a great deal of the incentive for public bodies to see that the
functions of government are carried out responsibility and with reasonable care."
Id.
99. Id. at 1358.
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As a final example, the Court of Appeals of Arizona rejected
the public duty doctrine in inspection scenarios in Brown v.
Syson. 1° ° In Brown, the plaintiffs alleged that the city negligently inspected the construction of their home resulting in their
home containing numerous building code violations. 10 1 The
Brown court stated that the public duty doctrine had been
expressly abandoned in an earlier court decision. 10 2 As a result,
Arizona courts "[should] no longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tortfeasor has a general duty to
the individual party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific individual duty, which means recovery."1 0 3 The court stated
that "the parameters of duty owed by the state will ultimately be
. . . subject to the same tort law as private citizens" and thus
rejected the application of the public duty doctrine in inspection

cases. 104
C.

North Carolina'sPosition
1.

Statutory Waiver of Governmental Immunity

Absent waiver, governmental immunity still provides an
absolute defense to municipalities against tort liability for negligent performance of code enforcement and inspections. 10 5 How100. Brown v. Syson, 663 P.2d 251, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Brown, the
plaintiffs alleged that the City of Bisbee negligently inspected their home such
that the home was constructed in violation of the Uniform Building Code and
Uniform Housing Code then in effect in the City of Bisbee. Id. at 252. The
Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded because the public duty
doctrine was no longer in effect in Arizona in light of Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597
(Ariz. 1982). Id. at 251-52. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
101. Brown, 663 P.2d at 251.
102. Id. at 252 (citing Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982)). In Ryan,
plaintiff brought a negligent supervision action against the State of Arizona
based on an escaped inmate's act of armed robbery against the plaintiff. Id. at
597. The Ryan court held that the public duty doctrine substituted the
previously abandoned sovereign immunity defense only in a "bright new-word
package." Id. at 598. Furthermore, the court answered the state's concern that
if the public duty doctrine was abandoned, the "government would come to a
standstill because its agents would be afraid to act." Id. at 598. The Ryan court
responded that purchasing liability insurance would sufficiently protect
government entities against financial ruin from adverse tort judgments. Id. at
599.
103. Id. (citing Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599).
104. Id.
105. See Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 10 N.C. App. 70, 178 S.E.2d 18 (1970),
cert. denied, 277 N.C. 727, 178 S.E.2d 831 (1971) (except where waived under
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ever, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4851 16 provides that if a municipality
authority of statute, the common law rule of governmental immunity is still the
law in North Carolina.). Note inspections are considered a governmental
function in North Carolina. See Pignott v. City of Wilmington, 50 N.C. App. 401,
273 S.E.2d 752 (1981), cert. denied, 303 N.C. 181, 280 S.E.2d 453 (1981) (holding
that the building inspector was a "public official" of the city who engaged in the
performance of governmental duties and no liability could attach unless the
inspector acted maliciously or corruptly or outside of and beyond the scope of his
duties). For a discussion of the governmental function - proprietary function
distinction and its ramifications in North Carolina, see Harper, Statutory
Waiver, supra note 27, at 47-49; Gray, Local Government Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 27, at 44-45.
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1986). Section 160A-485 provides:
Waiver of immunity through insurance purchase
(a) Any city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in
tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance. Participation in a
local government risk pool pursuant to Article 23 of General Statute
Chapter 58 shall be deemed to be the purchase of insurance for the
purposes of this section. Immunity shall be waived only to the
extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract from
tort liability. No formal action other than the purchase of liability
insurance shall be required to waive tort immunity, and no city shall
be deemed to have waived its tort immunity by any action other than
the purchase of liability insurance.
(b) An insurance contract purchased pursuant to this section may cover
such torts and such officials, employees, and agents of the city as the
governing board may determine. The city may purchase one or more
insurance contracts, each covering different torts or different
officials, employees, or agents of the city. An insurer who issues a
contract of insurance to a city pursuant to this section thereby
waives any defense based upon the governmental immunity of the
city, and any defense based upon lack of authority for the city to
enter into the contract. Each city is authorized to pay the lawful
premiums for insurance purchased pursuant to this section.
(c) Any plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against a city insured under
this section in any court of competent jurisdiction. As to any such
claim, to the extent that the city is insured against such claim
pursuant to this section, governmental immunity shall be no
defense. Except as expressly provided herein, to any tort claim
lodged against it, or to restrict, limit, or otherwise affect any defense
that the city may have at common law or by virtue of any statute.
Nothing in this section shall relieve a plaintiff from any duty to give
notice of his claim to the city, or to commence his action within the
applicable period of time limited by statute. No judgment may be
entered against a city in excess of its insurance policy limits on a tort
claim for which it would have been immune but for the purchase of
liability insurance pursuant to this section. No judgment may be
entered against a city on any tort claim for which it would have been
immune but for the purchase of liability insurance pursuant to this
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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purchases liability insurance, the municipality will be deemed to
have waived its governmental immunity to the extent of its liability insurance coverage. 10 7 As a result, North Carolina courts

section except a claim arising at a time when the city is insured
under an insurance contract purchased and issued pursuant to this
section. If, in the trial of any tort claim against a city for which it
would have been immune but for the purchase of liability insurance
pursuant to this section, a verdict is returned awarding damages to
the plaintiff in excess of the insurance limits, the presiding judge
shall reduce the award to the maximum policy limits before entering
judgment.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in this section, tort claims against a
city shall be governed by the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. No document or exhibit which relates to or alleges facts
as to the city's insurance against liability shall be read, exhibited, or
mentioned in the presence of the trial jury in the trial of any claim
brought pursuant to this section, nor shall the plaintiff, his counsel,
or anyone testifying in his behalf directly or indirectly convey to the
jury any interference that the city's potential liability is covered by
insurance. No judgment may be entered against the city unless the
plaintiff waives his right to a jury trial on all issues of law or fact
relating to insurance coverage. All issues relating to insurance
coverage shall be heard and determined by the judge without resort
to a jury. The jury shall be absent during all motions, arguments,
testimony, or announcement of findings of fact or conclusions of law
with respect to insurance coverage. The city may waive its right to
have issues concerning insurance coverage determined by the judge
without a jury, and may request a jury trial on these issues.
(e) Nothing in this section shall apply to any claim in tort against a city
for which the city is not immune from liability under the statutes or
common law of this State.
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1986), supra note 106. See also White v.
Mote, 270 N.C. 544, 155 S.E.2d 75 (1967) (A city waives its immunity from civil
liability in tort by purchasing liability insurance; however, immunity is waived
only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract.);
Galligan v. Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E.2d 427 (1970); Gordon v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 576 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 740
F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984); Herndon v. Barrett, 101 N.C. App. 636, 400 S.E.2d 767
(1991). For a discussion of the legislative purpose of section 160A-485, see
Tamura D. Coffey, Waiving Local Government Immunity in North Carolina:Risk
Management Programs Are Insurance, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 709 (1992)
(hereinafter "Coffey, Waiving Local Government Immunity") ("The explicit public
policy behind section 160A-485 is the concern for giving adequate compensation
to persons injured by a public entity. This concern is not simply tantamount, but
superior, to the investment of governmental immunity doctrine in the protection
of public assets."). Id. at 731

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

19

260

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:241

apply traditional negligence concepts to governmental tortfeasors
who have waived their governmental immunity.'0 8
Prior to this statutory abrogation of sovereign immunity,
North Carolina courts had no reason to apply traditional negligence concepts to governmental activities.' 0 9 Now, plaintiffs may
assert a claim against a city, political subdivision, or other government agency whereas previously the cause of action would have
been barred by the defense of governmental immunity. 1 10 In
response to an allegation of liability in tort, a city, political subdivision, or other government agency may assert any common law or
statutory defense available, except governmental immunity.1 1 '
Once a governmental entity elects to purchase liability insurance,
the governmental entity elects to be treated for tort liability purposes, like any other private entity." 2 Consequently, under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 160A-485, a municipality that purchases liability
insurance for its inspection department may be liable for negligent code enforcement.

108. Coffey, Waiving Local Government Immunity, supra note 107, at 731.
109. For a discussion of the governmental function - proprietary function
distinction and its ramifications in North Carolina see Harper, Statutory Waiver,
supra note 27, at 47-49, Gray, Local Government Sovereign Immunity, supra
note 27, at 44-45.
110. North Carolina courts have interpreted section 160A-485 as not creating
any new causes of actions. Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2
(1988), cert. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988) (A waiver of
governmental immunity did not create a cause of action where one did not
previously exist.). Further, the logical reading of section 160A-485 is that the
barrier of governmental immunity may not be employed when the city could have
raised it as a defense. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1986), supra note 106.
Therefore, the result under section 160A-485 is that it does not create any new
liability for a municipality; it only removes the defense of governmental
immunity from tort liability when the governmental entity purchases liability
insurance.
111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1986), supra note 106:
Any plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against a city insured under this
section ...

As to any such claim, to the extent that the city is insured

against such claim pursuant to this section, governmental immunity
shall be no defense. Except as expressly provided herein, to any tort
claim lodged against it, or to restrict, limit, or otherwise affect any
defense that the city may have at common law or by virtue of any
statutes.
112. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text:
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3

20

Swindell: Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in Sinning v. Clark

1996]
2.

NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS

261

Survey of Public Duty Doctrine Cases

North Carolina limits application of the public duty doctrine
to "police protection" scenarios. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals first embraced the public duty doctrine in Coleman v.
Cooper."' In Coleman, the plaintiff alleged that the City of
Raleigh, through its police department, and Wake County,
through the Wake County Department of Social Services, negligently failed to protect her two daughters from their murderer/
father when both defendants knew the victims' murderer/father
was dangerous. 1 14 The Coleman court rejected an argument advocating a special duty of protection as it related to police officers,
thereby formally adopting the public duty doctrine and relieving
the city and its police department of liability.1 5 The court of
appeals described the public duty doctrine as follows: "[When] furnishing police protection, a municipality ordinarily acts for the
benefit of the public at large and not for a specific individual.. As
the duty is to the general public rather than to a specific individual no liability exists for the failure to furnish police protection." 6 The Coleman court concluded that the "special

113. Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988), cert. denied,
322 N.C. 834, 317 S.E.2d 275 (1988). In Coleman, the mother of two daughters
brought a wrongful death suit arising out of their murders by her former
husband, who was their father and stepfather. Id. at 189-90, 366 S.E.2d at 3-4.
Plaintiff sued the City of Raleigh, the Raleigh Police Department, Wake County,
and Cooper (employee of the Wake County Department of Social Services). Id. at
188, 366 S.E.2d at 2. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently failed to
protect her minor children from their murder when both defendants knew of
previous sexual molestations and the dangerous propensities of the fathermurderer. Id. at 189-91, 366 S.E.2d at 4-5.
114. Id. at 189-91, 366 S.E.2d at 4-5.
115. Id. at 192-95, 366 S.E.2d at 5-7.
116. Id. at 192-93, 366 S.E.2d at 5-6 (citations omitted). The Coleman court
stated the rationale behind adoption of the public duty doctrine as follows: The
"amount of police protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of
the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those
resources may be deployed . . . This is quite different from the predictable
allocation of resources and liabilities when public hospitals, rapid transit
systems, or even highways are provided." Id at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 6. Note the
Coleman court stated that "unless a statute provides to the contrary, only
persons in being may be sued." Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 5. The court concluded
that no statute existed in North Carolina which authorized suits against police
departments. Id.
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relationship" and "special duty" exceptions
to the public duty doc1 17
trine did not apply under these facts.
When considering Wake County's liability, the court of
appeals found that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-517, et seq., which deals
with the treatment of juveniles who have been found to be abused
or neglected, created a specific duty owed to a particular class of
individuals, 1 18 and the violation of that specific duty constituted
negligence per se. 1 9 The court held that the social worker's failure to notify proper authorities violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A544. 120 The court further held that one of the statute's specific
purposes was to protect minors from harm and that the harm
which resulted constituted the specific type of harm the statute
intended to prevent.' 2 1 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the
social worker's violation of the statute constituted negligence per
se. 1 22 The court of appeals in Coleman applied the public duty
doctrine to the police protection scenario and specifically recognized that a statutorily prescribed standard of conduct creates a
117. Id. at 193-95, 366 S.E.2d at 6-7. For a discussion of the public duty
doctrine's exceptions, see infra notes 126-27, 134, 138 and accompanying text.
118. Id. at 195-197, 366 S.E.2d at 7-8. The Coleman court first started their
analysis by dismissing Wake County's defense of sovereign immunity because
Wake County waived this defense by purchasing liability insurance pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435. Id. at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 7. This statute is similar
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 195-97, 366 S.E.2d at 7-8. The Coleman court held that a "standard
of conduct may be determined by reference to a statute which imposes upon a
person a specific duty for the protection of others so that a violation of the statute
is negligence per se." Id. at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 7. (citing Lutz Indus. Inc. v. Dixie
Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955)). The court cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 286 which provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 (1985).
120. Coleman, 89 N.C. App. at 195-98, 366 S.E.2d at 7-8.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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specific duty or "special duty" which bars application of the public
duty doctrine.
The North Carolina Supreme Court officially recognized the
public duty doctrine in Braswell v. Braswell.1 2 3 In Braswell, the
plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the Pitt County Sheriff's Department for failing to provide police protection.1 2 4 The
Braswell court held that a municipality and its law enforcement
agents act for the benefit of the public and there is no liability for
failing to provide police protection to specific individuals. 125 The
court also recognized two exceptions to the public duty doctrine
12 6 or "special duty"1 2 7
which arise when a "special relationship"
between the injured individual and the police has arisen. 1 2 The
North Carolina Supreme Court pragmatically justified the adoption of the public duty doctrine on the grounds that the doctrine
"recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses
123. Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).
124. Id. at 366, 410 S.E.2d at 899. In Braswell, the plaintiff, the administrator
of the estate of a woman who was fatally shot by her estranged husband, a
deputy sheriff, brought suit against the sheriff for the alleged negligent failure to
provide police protection and for continuing to employ the husband/deputy after
learning of threats against the decedent. Id. at 363-70, 410 S.E.2d at 897-901.
The trial court granted a directed verdict for the sheriff. Id. at 366-67, 410
S.E.2d at 899. The court of appeals, 98 N.C. App. 231, 390 S.E.2d 752 (1990),
ordered a new trial on the negligent failure to protect. Id. at 368, 410 S.E.2d at
899.
125. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The Braswell court
defined the public duty doctrine as follows: "[A] municipality and its agents act
for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to
furnish police protection to specific individuals." Id. (citing Coleman, supra note
113 and accompanying text).
126. Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (A special relationship arises between an
injured party and the police when the injured party has been a state's witness or
an informant who has aided law enforcement officers.) (citing Coleman, supra
note 113).
127. Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (A special duty arises when a municipality,
through its police officers, promises protection to an individual, the protection is
not forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on the promise of protection
causally related to the injury suffered) (citing Coleman, supra note 113). The
Braswell court further discussed the "special duty" exception when the plaintiff
relied on it for liability. Id. To make out a prima facie case under the "special
duty" exception to the public duty doctrine the "plaintiff must show that an
actual promise was made by the police to create a special duty, that this promise
was reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff, and that this reliance was causally
related to the injury ultimately suffered by plaintiff." Id.
128. Id. ("Although we have not heretofore adopted the doctrine with its
exceptions, we do so now.").
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to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure
to prevent every criminal act. " 1 2 9 Thus, the Braswell court
embraced a limited application of the public duty doctrine to police
protection" scenarios.
Since Braswell, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
applied the public duty doctrine in three cases, each involving
quasi-police protection duties. 3 ° In Prevette v. Forsyth County,3 1
the plaintiff brought an action against Forsyth County and the
Forsyth County Animal Control Department alleging they negligently failed to protect an individual from vicious dogs which the
defendants knew were dangerous. 3 2 The Prevette court held that
the Animal Control officers act for the benefit of the public, and
that no liability exists for failing to furnish police protection to
specific individuals. 1 3 3 Furthermore, the "special relationship"

129. Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 901. The Braswell court further stated that "the
amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the
community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those
resources may be deployed." Id.
130. Prior to Braswell, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the public
duty doctrine in two cases. Both cases were "failure to furnish police protection"
scenarios. See supra notes 113 and accompanying text; Hull v. Cantrell, 104
N.C. App. 29, 407 S.E.2d 611 (1991) (The general rule is that law enforcement
agencies and officials are not under a duty to protect individuals from the
criminal actions of others unless there is a special relationship or special duty.).
131. Prevette v. Forsyth County, 110 N.C. App. 754, 431 S.E.2d 216 (1993). In
Prevette, the plaintiff administratrix of the estate of an individual who was killed
by a dog attack, alleged that Forsyth County, through its animal control
departments, was charged with the responsibility of enforcing all state and
county laws relating to the care, custody, and control of animals, including the
confinement of vicious dogs. Id. at 756, 431 S.E.2d at 217. Further, Prevette
plaintiff alleged that the animal control departments knew or should have known
of the dangerous propensities of the two animals because of previous
detainments made by them. Id. at 757, 431 S.E.2d at 218. The plaintiffs
asserted that the defendants "were negligent because they failed to adequately
train and supervise their employees/agents..." Id.
132. Id. at 757, 431 S.E.2d at 218 ("The defendants in the case at bar are being
sued for their alleged failure to properly protect an individual from dogs which
the defendants allegedly knew or had reason to know were dangerous.").
133. Id. at 756-757, 431 S.E.2d at 218. The Prevette court quoted at length the
Braswell court's adoption of the public duty doctrine. Id. at 757, 431 S.E.2d at
2i8. The court then held "because this cause of action clearly arises out of
Forsyth County's agents alleged failure to provide sufficient protection to the
individual decedent in this case, we must find that the public duty doctrine
applies here and bars plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 758, 431 S.E.2d at 218.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply even though
the officers knew of the dangerous propensities of the dogs.'
Similarly, in Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 13 5 the plaintiff
asserted that the City of Burlington and its police officers negligently failed to properly investigate the credentials of a driver
when the driver applied for a permit to operate a taxicab.' 3 6 The
Clark court held that police officers act for the benefit of the public, and that no liability exists for failing to furnish police protection. 13 7 Furthermore, the "special duty" exception to the public
duty doctrine did not apply because the municipal code provision
allowing police review before the issuance of taxi-cab permits "created no special duty owed by police to taxicab3 8 customers over and
above the duty owed to the general public."'
In Davis v. Messer,1 3 9 the plaintiff alleged that the Town of
Waynesville, its Fire Chief and Fire Department, and Haywood
County were negligent by initially responding to an emergency
911 call and thereafter not fighting the fire that consumed the
plaintiff's residence. 140 The Davis court held that the public duty
134. Id. at 758, 431 S.E.2d at 218-19 (Policing animal control officers in the
neighborhood in which victim was attacked is too broad to justify application of
the special relationship exception.).
135. Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 114 N.C. App. 400, 442 S.E.2d 75 (1994). In
Clark, the plaintiff alleged that the City of Burlington was negligent by failing to
properly investigate the credentials of an applicant for a permit to operate a
taxicab. Id. at 401, 442 S.E.2d at 76. The plaintiff in Clark, administrator of the
estate, contended that the issuance of a taxicab permit to a person who had a
felony record and a reputation for dangerous tendencies proximately caused the
death of the victim. Id.
136. Id. at 401-02, 442 S.E.2d at 76. In Clark, the City Code of Burlington
established certain procedures for obtaining a taxicab permit, including general
inspection by the police authorities into the overall character of an applicant to
operate a taxicab. Id at 402. Further, a right to refuse an applicant with a
felony record was provided in the same municipal code. Id.
137. Id. at 404, 442 S.E.2d at 78 ("This case is governed by the 'public duty
doctrine', or the general common law rule that 'a municipality and its agents act
for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to
furnish police protection to specific individuals'.").
138. Id. at 405, 442 S.E.2d at 78-79 ("Here, plaintiff has no alleged facts which
would indicate the City of Burlington made an overt promise to protect [the
plaintiff], giving rise to a special duty owed.").
139. 119 N.C. App. 44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995).
140. Id. at 51-52, 457 S.E.2d at 907. In Davis, the 911 operator reported the
fire call and specifically inquired whether the residence was in a certain fire
district. Id. at 55, 457 S.E.2d at 909. Messer, the Fire Chief, and his crew
promptly proceeded toward the fire. Id. However, they never reached their

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3

266

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:241

doctrine applied to fire protection services because fire protection
services were "sufficiently similar to the protective services offered
by... police department[s]..."141 However, the plaintiff in Davis
did state sufficient factual circumstances to invoke the "special
duty" exception. 142 The court explained that by the Town
"accepting the 911 call and proceeding towards the scene of the
fire, the town (through the acts of its employee, Messer, and its
fire department) promised it would provide fire-fighting assistance
and protection; the promised protection never arrived; and plaintiffs relied upon the promise to respond to fire as their exclusive
source of aid, resulting in the complete destruction of their
home."1 43
3.

Lynn v. Overlook Development, Inc.

In Lynn v. Overlook Development, Inc., the North Carolina
Court of Appeals expanded the application of the public duty doctrine and held that a municipal building inspector owes no legal
duty to a specific individual.'" The Lynn appellate court concluded that a municipality could not be liable to an individual
plaintiff because the North Carolina Building Code provides a
duty to the public at large. 45 However, the court's application of
destination because Messer ordered the fire truck to return to the station when
only .4 mile from the plaintiff's burning home after Messer discovered the
plaintiff's residence was out of his fire district. Id.
141. Id. at 55-56, 457 S.E.2d at 909.
142. Id. at 56-57, 457 S.E.2d at 909-10. The Davis court defined the "special
duty" exception as "when a municipality through its protective officers has
created a special duty to a particular individual by promise of protection causally
related to the injury suffered." Id.
143. Id. at 56-57, 457 S.E.2d at 910.
144. 98 N.C. App. 75, 389 S.E.2d 609 (1990). In Lynn, the plaintiffs purchased
a new condominium unit from the Overlook Development. Id. at 76-77, 403
S.E.2d at 610-11. Upon completion of the unit, the plaintiffs assumed occupancy
until numerous construction defects were discovered. Id. The plaintiffs brought
suit against the City of Asheville and its building inspector, among others, for
negligent inspection of the plaintiff's unit. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that "the
inspector was negligent under the standards set forth at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 160A-411, et. seq. and the North Carolina Building Code § 105 in that he
improperly issued a building permit to [defendants], failed to observe code
violations in the construction of plaintiff's unit, or alternately, having observed
such violations, failed to take appropriate remedial measures, including
notifying the plaintiffs and revoking the building permit." Id. at 78, 403 S.E.2d
at 613.
145. It is equally undeniable, however, that such powers fall within the
City's statutory police powers, and consequently, the duty owed in this
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss2/3
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the public duty doctrine to municipal building inspections must be
carefully scrutinized in light of the North Carolina Supreme
Court's analysis in Lynn.
Contrary to the court of appeals, the North Carolina Supreme
Court, when reviewing Lynn v. Overlook Development,1 4 6 assumed
for purposes of its decision, without specifically deciding, that a
duty existed to the individual plaintiff and disregarded the public
duty doctrine, which was advanced by the court of appeals. 14 7 The
failure of the supreme court to acknowledge the legal duty argument made by the court of appeals and the lengthy discussion by
the supreme court regarding the building inspector's duties raises
the question whether the public duty doctrine applies to the
inspection scenario. 14 8 Additionally, the argument advocated by
the supreme court in Lynn implicitly suggests that the North Carolina Statutes and the North Carolina Building Code establish an
individual duty thus making the public duty doctrine inapplicable.1 49 Moreover, the statutory duties imposed upon the building
inspector appear to create an individual duty similar to the individual duty imposed upon the social worker in Coleman, but
unlike the non-statutorily imposed duties relating to the police.150
However, the supreme court's analysis of the duty found in North
Carolina's inspection statute failed to specifically adopt such an
analysis as controlling. 5 '

case is not to the plaintiffs individually but to the general public ...
Such a waiver [of sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance]
does not entitle plaintiffs to proceed against the City by predicating
recovery on those claims against [the building inspector] that were
properly dismissed.
Id. at 78-79, 403 S.E.2d at 613.
146. 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
147. The supreme court specifically assumed solely for the purposes of the
Lynn decision that an individual duty existed in the inspection statute. The
analysis by the supreme court thus "begs the question." whether such a duty
would be found by the court under a similar case without a proximate cause
problem. For additional analysis of the supreme court's decision in Lynn, see
infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
148. For a comparison of the supreme court's review of Lynn and Sinning, see
infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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ANALYSIS

Public Duty Doctrine Embraced in Code Enforcement Cases

In their complaint, the Sinnings alleged that the City of New
Bern's purchase of liability insurance removed the defense of governmental immunity which arose from code enforcement, a governmental fimction. 15 2 Acknowledging this, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals began its analysis in Sinning by implicitly noting that the City of New Bern could not be held liable unless the
individual defendants, acting within their official capacity, were
negligent.153 The court noted that "negligence presupposes the
existence of a legal relationship between the parties . . ." and "if
there is no duty, there can be no liability."' 5 4
The Sinning court then described the public duty doctrine as
follows: "[A] municipality and its agents ordinarily act for the benefit of the general public and not for a specific individual when
exercising its statutory police powers, and, therefore, cannot be
held liable for failure to carry out its statutory duties to an individual." 5 5 The court noted that the doctrine had been specifically
adopted in North Carolina, and that the prior decision of the court
of appeal's in Lynn made the doctrine applicable under these
facts. 156
B.

Rejection of the Public Duty Exceptions
1.

"SpecialRelationship"Not Contemplated in Sinning

The Sinning court next applied the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine to the facts of the case. The court noted that both
exceptions have been narrowly construed. The court stated that
the special relationship exception applies "where there is a special
relationship between the injured party and municipality." The
special duty exception applies "where the municipality... creates
a special duty by promising protection to the individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual reliance on the
57
promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered."
The special relationship exception did not arise under these facts
152. Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 516, 459 S.E.2d at 72.
153. Id. at 516, 459 S.E. 2d at 73.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 519-20, 459 S.E. 2d at 73-74.
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because no relationship was contemplated. 158 Moreover, if a special relationship arose under these facts, "a municipality would
become a virtual guarantor of the construction of every building
subject to its inspection, exposing it to an overwhelming burden of
liability for failure to detect every code violation or defect." 159
2. The North Carolina Supreme Court's Analysis of the
"SpecialDuty" Exception in Lynn Rejected in Sinning
The court of appeals did not follow the supreme court's reasoning in Lynn when it applied the "special duty" exception in
code enforcement cases. The Sinning court stated that "the
[Supreme] Court declined to decide the issue of whether [G.S.
§ 160-411 et. seq., and the North Carolina State Building code]
created a duty owed by the city building inspector to a purchaser
...Thus, we continue to follow our Court of Appeal's decision in
Lynn, . . . and hold [that the statutes and code] do not create a

to plaintiffs over and above the
special duty owed by defendants 160
duty owed to the general public."
By failing to follow the supreme court's analysis in Lynn, the
court of appeals in Sinning ignored a growing minority of jurisdictions that persuasively advocate that statutorily imposed duties
prescribing a standard of conduct for an inspector establish an
individual duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs injured by the negligence of such inspection. The Sinning court's failure to analyze
the issue is a major judicial oversight. If an individual duty is
found, such duty would bar the application of the public duty doctrine. Other jurisdictions which have decided the issue, such as
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Coffey, rejected the doctrine
because the Wisconsin inspection statute imposed a duty and prescribed a standard of conduct for the inspectors.'' Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Wilson rejected the doctrine because
the inspection statute created an individual duty to foreseeable
plaintiffs injured by the negligence of the inspectors 162 . Further,
158. Id. at 520, 459 S.E. 2d at 74.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Coffey, 247 N.W.2d at 132. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Coffey
held that a building inspector must be held to have foreseen that his alleged
negligence in performing the required inspection might have foreseeably resulted

in harm to the owners and occupants. Id.
162. Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 664. The Supreme Court of Iowa in Wilson held
that the inspection "statutes and ordinances were designed for the protection of a
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the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Stewart rejected the doctrine
because the duty found within the inspection statute was designed
to protect a particular class of individuals injured by negligent
inspections. 6 3 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Arizona in
Brown rejected the doctrine because the inspection statute created an individual duty to owners injured by negligent inspections.16 4 The modern trend, 1 6 5 which the Sinning court failed to
acknowledge, relies on an inspection statute which imposes a duty
and a standard of conduct upon the inspector, thereby creating an
individual duty to foreseeable plaintiffs injured by the inspector's
negligence, resulting in the inapplicability of the public duty
doctrine.
Because the Sinning court decided the issue was controlled by
the court of appeal's decision in Lynn, there was no need to analyze North Carolina's inspection statutes. However, an analysis of
Chapter 160A of the North Carolina General Statutes, which contains North Carolina's statutory scheme of inspection regulation,
reveals the fallacy of the Sinning court's conclusion that a "special
duty" does not exist. First, in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-411,' 6 6 all
cities are required, by one of several authorized methods, to perform the duties and responsibilities listed in section 160A-412 ,167
including enforcing state and local laws relating to the construcspecial, identifiable group of persons... from a particular harm ...not members
of the public generally." Id.
163. Stewart, 386 So.2d at 1351. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Stewart
found that their inspection statute created foreseeable plaintiffs through the
class intended to be protected. Id.
164. Brown, 663 P.2d at 252. The Brown court stated that "the paremeters of
duty owed by the state will be... subject to the same tort law as private citizens"
and thus rejected the application of the public duty doctrine to inspection cases
by relying on a statutorily imposed duty upon an inspector. Id.
165. Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 667 ("Moreover, the trend in this area is toward
liability. The public duty doctrine has lost support. .
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-411, supra note 4.
167. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-412 (1982). Section 160A-412 provides:
The duties and responsibilities of an inspection department and of the
inspectors therein shall be to enforce within their territorial jurisdiction
State and local laws relating to
(1) The construction of buildings and other structures;
(2) The installation of such facilities as plumbing systems, electrical
systems, heating systems, refregeration systems, and air
conditioning systems;
(3) The maintenance of buildings and other structures in a safe,
sanitary, and healthful condition;
(4) Other matters that may be specified by the city council.
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tion of buildings, installation of facilities, and maintenance of
buildings. These duties include the issuance and denial of building permits and certificates of compliance. 6 ' Further, during the
construction process, municipal building inspectors must make as
many inspections as are necessary to satisfy themselves that the
work is being done in accordance with all applicable laws and with
the terms of the permit. 1 6 9 No completed building may be occupied until the inspector, after a final inspection, issues a certificate of compliance which states that the structure complies with
all applicable state and local laws.' 7 0 Moreover, if at anytime during an inspection, the inspector finds any defects or finds that the
building has not been constructed in accordance with applicable
state and local laws, the inspector is to notify the owner or occupant. 17 Furthermore, an inspector who willfully fails to perform
any of his required duties will be subject to criminal prosecuThese duties shall include the receipt of all applications for permits and the
issuance or denial of permits, the making of any necessary inspections, the
issuance or denial of certificates of compliance, the issuance of orders to correct
violations, the bringing of judicial actions against actual or threatened
violations, the keeping of adequate records, and any other actions that may be
required in order to adequately enforce those laws. The city council shall have
the authority to enact reasonable and appropriate provisions to enforce these
laws.
168. Id.
169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-420 (1982). Section 160A-420 provides:
As the work pursuant to a permit progresses, local inspectors shall
make as many inspections thereof as may be necessary to satisfy them
that work is being done according to the provisions of any applicable
State and local laws and of the terms of the permit. In exercising this
power, members of the inspection department shall have a right to enter
on any premises within the jurisdiction of the department at all
reasonable hours for the purposes of inspection or enforcement action,
upon presentation of proper credentials.
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-423, supra note 5.
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-425 (1982). Section 160A-425 provides:
Defects in building to be corrected.
When a local inspector finds any defects in a building, or finds that a
building has not been constructed in accordance with the applicable
State and local laws, or that a building because of its condition is
dangerous or contains fire hazardous conditions, it shall be his duty to
notify the owner or occupant of the building of its defects, hazardous
conditions, or failure to comply with law. The owner or occupant of the
building of its defects, hazardous conditions, or failure to comply with
law. The owner or occupant shall immediately remedy the defects,
hazardous conditions, or violations of law in the property he owns.
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tion.' 7 2 Clearly, the Sinning court failed to adequately examine
the statutory authority and recognize the individual duty contained therein.
In addition, the Sinning court's analysis disregarded traditional statutory interpretation. It is well settled in North Carolina
that a statute designed for the protection of the public is a "safety"
enactment, the violation of which constitutes negligence per se,
unless otherwise provided by the legislature. 1 73 Where a statute
is not a "safety" enactment but sets a standard of conduct, a violation of the statute may be evidence of negligence. 1 74 In Coleman,
the court held that "a standard of conduct may be determined by
reference to a statute which imposed upon a person a specific duty
for the protection of others so that a violation of the statute is negligence per se ."175 Further, the Coleman court clearly established
that a statutorily imposed standard of conduct bars application of
the public duty doctrine because the statute creates an individual
duty to the plaintiff.1 76 Thus, according to Coleman, if the duties
imposed on an inspector are contained within a "safety" enactment or is prescribed by statute, the legislature intended to create
an individual duty. This duty would bar application of the public
duty doctrine.
Contrary to the Sinning court's analysis, the supreme court in
Lynn v. Overlook Development addressed the issue of whether the
statutory duties imposed on building inspectors pursuant N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 160A-411 et seq., are safety regulations which impose
172. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-416 (1993). Section 160A-416 provides:
If any member of the inspection department shall willfully fail to
perform the duties required of him by law, or willfully shall improperly
issue a permit, or shall willfully give a certificate of compliance without
first making the inspections required by law, or willfully shall
improperly give a certificate of compliance, he shall be guilty of a Class I
misdemeanor.
173. See, e.g., Jackson v. Housing Auth. of High Point, 73 N.C. App. 363, 369,
326 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1985) ("A statute or ordinance designed for the protection of
the public is a 'safety' enactment and its violation constitutes negligence per se,
unless the legislative body provides otherwise: and where a statute or ordinance
is not a 'safety' enactment but sets a standard of conduct, its violation may be
evidence of negligence."); Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2
(1988), cert. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988); Lutz Indus., Inc. v.
Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955); Lynn v.
Overlook Dev., Inc., 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
174. Jackson, 73 N.C. App. 369, 326 S.E.2d at 300.
175. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
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a statutory standard of care. 17 7 The plaintiff in Lynn filed an
action for damages against the inspection department, the City of
Asheville, and others arising from the alleged wrongful issuance
of a building permit to an unlicensed contractor, negligent inspection, and for failing to take appropriate remedial measures such
178
as notifying the plaintiff of revocation of the building permit.
Similar to the plaintiff in Sinning, the plaintiff in Lynn alleged
that the building inspector was negligent because he violated the
standard set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-411 et seq., and the
North Carolina Building Code § 105.179
The supreme court initially decided whether sections 160A411 et seq., were "safety" enactments which provide a statutory
standard of care for building inspectors.' 8 0 After reviewing the
statutory scheme, the court stated that "it appears that one of the
specific purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-411 to -425 is to promote the safety of the general public." 18 ' Relying on those statutes, the court held that "the language of the Building Code
suggests that the particular provisions of the Code pertinent here
are safety regulations... The intent of the Building Code is evident in its stated purpose to promote the public health, safety,
177. Lynn, 328 N.C. at 689, 403 S.E.2d 469. The Lynn court started by
brazenly stating "our appraisal of the facts found in the complaint and exhibits
differs somewhat from the facts stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals."
Id. at 690, 403 S.E.2d at 469. The Lynn court noted that plaintiffs assumed
occupancy before a certificate of compliance, "a precondition for legal occupancy,"
was issued. Id. Further, "an inspection was conducted by [the building inspector
after plaintiffs had moved in] but [the inspector] did not issue a certificate of
compliance, inform the plaintiffs of any problems with construction, or inform
them that they were occupying the unit in violation of N.C.G.S. § 160A-423." Id.
178. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
179. Lynn, 328 N.C. at 689, 403 S.E.2d 469.
180. Id. at 692, 403 S.E.2d at 471 ("[We must first determine whether the
statute complained of is a safety statute and whether plaintiffs belong to the
class of persons for whose protection and benefit the statute and the Building
Code were enacted.").
181. Id. at 695, 403 S.E.2d at 472. The Lynn court noted that the statutes and
the building code were silent as to the legislative purpose and to the class of
persons for whose benefit they were enacted. Id. at 694, 403 S.E.2d at 472. The
court then stated that "careful consideration of the provisions" and "the ends
they were manifestly intended to accomplish" must determine the intent. Id. To
reach this legislative intent, the Lynn court quoted the enabling statute: "All
regulations contained in the North Carolina State Building Code shall have a
reasonable and substantial connection with the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare and their provisions shall be liberally construed to those ends."
Id.
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morals, or general welfare."18 2 In addition, the court concluded
that sections 160A-411 et seq., are "safety" regulations which
impose an individual duty upon the inspector, the violation of
which may be negligence per se.183
Because Coleman recognized that a statutory duty creates a
"special duty" to protect a specific class of plaintiffs from a particular type of harm, and because the supreme court in Lynn held that
damages relating to an inspector's acts or omissions constitute the
particular type of harm which sections 160A-411 et seq., seek to
protect, North Carolina's inspection statute, similar to the statutes in Wisconsin, Iowa, Louisiana, and Arizona, imposes a standard of conduct upon inspectors. 8 4 Further, just as the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Wilson found that the particular language of the
inspection statute provided a basis for imposing a standard of conduct,' 8 5 North Carolina'a inspection statute, applying the
supreme court's decision in Lynn, provides a strong foundation
upon which to establish a statutory standard of care for inspectors.1 86 Furthermore, similar to the statutorily imposed duties in
Stewart, the statutory duties imposed on North Carolina building
inspectors "empower[s] and obligate[s] them to issue such notices
and orders necessary to enforce codal compliance, to remove
unsafe and illegal conditions, and to secure the necessary safeguards during construction."18 7 Clearly, the North Carolina
inspection statute prescribes a standard of conduct similar to
182. Id.
183. Id. at 695-96, 403 S.E.2d at 472-73 ("Although the violation of a statute
which imposes a duty upon city building inspectors in order to promote the safety
of the public, including the plaintiffs, may be negligence per se, such negligence is
actionable only if it is the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff."). The
Lynn court was unclear whether these particular plaintiffs as purchasers were
within the class intended to be protected. Id. at 695, 403 S.E.2d at 472. As such,
the court stated "[a]ssuming without deciding the issue, that a city building
inspector owes a statutory duty to these particular plaintiffs as purchasers..." to
reach the easier question of proximate cause. Id. at 695, 403 S.E.2d at 472-73.
The court specifically held that when the plaintiffs elected to assume occupancy
before the final inspection, that act constituted "an intervening, independent
cause of plaintiffs' damages." Id. at 696-97, 403 S.E.2d at 473. "Therefore, the
acts or omissions by the city building inspector did not proximately cause the
plaintiffs' damages." Id.
184. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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those found in states that have rejected the public duty doctrine in
inspection cases.
As the Sinning court recognized but failed to address, the
question remains whether owners and occupants are the intended
beneficiaries of the duties imposed upon building inspectors.
However, North Carolina courts consistently construe the
intended beneficiaries of N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 160A-411-438, and
the North Carolina Building Code as the owners and occupants of
buildings. Although the action was not levied against a building
inspector in Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, the court
of appeals stated that "the obvious purpose of [160A-425] is to protect the lives and limbs of the occupants of the building
affected."' 8 8 Similarly, in Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores,
the supreme court held that the "legislative purpose of the [Building Code] was 'to protect life, health and property.' "189 Thus, the
Sinning court's application of the public duty doctrine to inspection cases in North Carolina is illogical.' 90 Moreover, according to
Lynn, a violation of the duties set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A411-438 is negligence per se.
Clearly, the Sinning court declined to follow the road map
which the supreme court in Lynn charted. The Sinning court concluded, with very little analysis, that the court of appeal's decision
in Lynn as controlling and declined to analyze any of the relevant
issues related to the "special duty" exception. Therefore, because
the court of appeals in Sinning "missed the boat" by not adopting
the "special duty" exception, North Carolina should re-examine
application of the public duty doctrine to code enforcement cases
and disregard the Sinning opinion as controlling.
C. Sinning's Failure to Consider Tort Principles of Affirmative
Action and Reliance
Another approach the Sinning court failed to address was the
effect of the tort principles of affirmative action and reliance in
188. Jackson v. Housing Auth. Of High Point, 73 N.C. App. 363, 369, 326
S.E.2d 295, 299 (1985). In Jackson, the defendant was a municipality but the
alleged misconduct arose from its capacity as a landlord. Id. at 364-65, 326
S.E.2d at 297.
189. 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955). In Lutz, the defendant was
a private corporation. The status of the defendant should not change the
intended beneficiaries of a particular statute.
190. To allow such an inconsistently, North Carolina would in essence
resurrect the defense of sovereign immunity. See supra notes 70-79 and
accompanying text.
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code enforcement situations. Contrary to Sinning, several courts
from other jurisdictions have buttressed their rejection of the public duty doctrine I inspection cases by concluding that once an
inspector undertakes to perform an inspection, an individual duty
to exercise ordinary care arises to protect owners and occupants
from harm. The Supreme Court of Alaska in Adams recognized
the affirmative action principle by holding that
once an inspection has been undertaken, the stat has a further
duty to exercise reasonable care in conduction fire safety inspections, and that liability will attach where there is a negligent failure to discover a fire hazard which would be
brought to light by an
91
inspection conducted with ordinary care.'
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Coffey recognized the affirmative action principle in statutorily mandated duties by holding
that once the inspector undertook to conduct the required inspection, the inspector had a duty to exercise reasonable care during
that inspection.' 92
Because the Sinning court decided the issue was controlled by
the court of appeals decision in Lynn, there was no need to analyze North Carolina's inspections statutes in conjunction with the
doctrines of affirmative action and reliance. However, North Carolina imposes upon every person, who enters into an active course
of conduct, the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect
others from harm. 1 93 Further, a violation of the duty created by
active conduct is negligence.' 9 4 Contrary to Sinning but similar to
Adams and Coffey, once an inspector undertakes to perform the
duties required in 160A-411,19 5 the tort principles of affirmative
action and reliance further justify not applying the public duty
doctrine to inspection cases. The individual duty found in actively
conducting inspection makes the public duty doctrine inapplicable.' 9 6 Thus, once an inspector enters a premises, a duty arose to
properly inspect the premises to protect the owners and occupants
from harm. 1 9 7 Therefore, because the court of appeals in Sinning
191. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240 (Alaska 1976).
192. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Williamson v. Clay, 243 N.C. 337, 90 S.E.2d 727(1956); Council v.
Dickerson's Inc., 233 N.C. 472, 64 S.E.2d 551(1951); Abner Corp. v. City Roofing
& Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 326 S.E.2d 632(1985); Baker v. Dept. Of
Corrections, 85 N.C. App. 345, 354 S.E.2d 733(1987).
194. See cases cited supra note 193.
195. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 76-79, 80-84 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 76-79, 80-84 and accompanying text.
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failed to apply the tort doctrines of affirmative action and reliance,
North Carolina should re-examine application of the public duty
doctrine to code enforcement cases and disregard the Sinning
opinion as controlling.
D.

Sinning's failure to weigh policy considerations

The Sinning court failed to weigh any policy considerations.
In doing so, the Sinning court failed to recognize that expansion of
the public duty doctrine to municipal building inspections is not
supported by the same policy reasons used by courts in applying
the doctrine to police protection services. The distinction between
police protection and building inspection is equivalent to "nonfeasance" 198 versus "misfeasance". 9 9 The Coleman and Braswell
courts limited adoption of the public duty doctrine was grounded
upon the theory that the imposition of a duty upon the limited
resources of law enforcement "to prevent every criminal act"
would create "an overwhelming burden of liability."20 0 "Nonfeasance" from failure to provide police protection is factually and
legally distinguishable from the scenario created by building
inspections.
The building inspector commits an affirmative act of negligence, or "misfeasance",20 1 which is rooted in the negligent performance of statutorily mandated duties. Specifically, the
building inspector visits a construction site and actively participates by inspecting the ongoing and completed portions of the
198. Nonfeasance is defined, with respect to public officials, as the substantial
failure to perform a required legal duty. BLAcKes LAw DICTIONARY 1054 (6th ed.
1990).
199. Misfeasance is defined, with respect to public officials, as doing in a
wrongful manner that which the law authorizes or requires. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1054 (6th ed. 1990). "Nonfeasance" refers to total omission or failure
to act while "misfeasance" is acting wrongfully. Id. The distinction is that by
"misfeasance", a new risk of harm has been created by the conduct of the
defendant, while by "nonfeasance", the defendant did not make the situation
worse, he merely failed to benefit the plaintiff by intervening. W. PAGE KEETON,
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, sec. 56 (5th ed. 1984). See
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 338-39 ()("Liability for
'misfeasance' then may extend to any whom harm may reasonably be anticipated
as a result of the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond (cite); while for
'nonfeasance' it is necessary to find some definite relationship between the
parties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to
act."
200. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 199.
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structure. In addition, all new construction must be inspected by
a building inspector.2 °2 The factual equivalent in police protection
would be if every citizen had a personal police officer escorting
them to ensure protection. Clearly, the "limited resources" justification does not apply to inspections because all new construction
must be inspected regardless of allotted resources.2 °3 The Sinning court's failure to recognize these considerations is but
another nail in the coffin of the public duty doctrine.
Perhaps the strongest policy consideration overlooked by the
Sinning court is that, from a practical standpoint, extension of the
public duty doctrine to building inspection cases leaves an individual constructing a home in an extremely difficult position. The
individual often is in a position to know or understand the intricacies of the building code or correct engineering calculations for
proper construction. Instead, homeowners rely on their general
contractor and building inspect to insure compliance with the
applicable state and local laws. Thus, municipalities are in the
enviable position of having statutory responsibility for insuring
the compliance and safety of the construction, but when they
prove incapable of performing their responsibilities, they claim
governmental immunity via the public duty doctrine. This position is illogical. Without accountability to injured individuals,
inspection departments serve no useful purpose because they are
required to act for the benefit of anyone. Certainly, public policy is
not offended by holding government accountable when they have a
required duty to inspect new construction. Indeed, public policy
demands that building inspectors be competent and act with due
care when they inspect premises that they are statutorily charged
with inspecting, if they are going to inspect at all.
V.

CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Court of Appeal's decision in Sinning v.
Clark sets forth the standard to be used when determining
whether a municipality is liable for the negligent acts of its building code enforcers. The court invoked the public duty doctrine and
declined to follow the reasoning used by the supreme court in
Lynn v. Overlook Development Company, which would have

allowed the "special duty" exception to be applied in code enforcement cases. The court failed to acknowledge that sec. 160A-411202. See supra nots 166-72 and accompanying text.
203. See supra nots 166-72 and accompanying text.
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438 creates an individual actionable duty against the municipality. In addition, an individual duty to exercise reasonable care
may be independently imposed upon a building inspector resulting from his affirmative conduct and the homeowner's reliance
when performing the statutorily required duties.
Accordingly, North Carolina should re-examine application of
the public duty doctrine in code enforcement cases and disregard
the Sinning opinion. If not, municipalities can cower behind governmental immunity after acting negligently. Without accountability to injured homeowners, inspection departments serves no
useful purpose because they are not required to act for the benefit
of anyone. The citizens of North Carolina deserve a government
that will perform necessary services with competence ad compensate individuals who are injured at the expense of governmental
torts.
Frank Swindell
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